

Teacher Incentives By State

State	Incentives
Alabama	Scholarships up to \$20,000 over four years for undergrads who agree to teach in Alabama public schools. Loan forgiveness for teachers in high-need schools. Various monetary incentives by district.
Alaska	Due to budget cuts in recent years, few incentive programs are currently funded.
Arizona	The Arizona Ready-for-Rigor Project provides pay-for-performance incentives to encourage high-quality teachers to teach in high-needs schools.
Arkansas	Arkansas offers increased pay to teachers of high-need subjects or teachers willing to work in high-demand districts. The state provides bonuses for teachers with National Board Certification: between \$1000-\$2000 in 2005/2006. Formally offered housing support for teachers, however the program no longer appears to be funded.
California	California rewards teachers with a slight increase in salary for each semester unit of undergraduate coursework taken, as well as for years of experience. Additionally, teachers are eligible for the Good Neighbor Next Door program, which provides a significant discount on housing in certain areas. State and local agencies can issue tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds or credit certificates to credentialed teachers and administrators who are employed at a low performing K-12 CA schools. .
Colorado	Colorado offers differential pay and loan forgiveness to teachers working in high needs schools. Teachers receive compensation based on a variety of criteria including: length of employment, school performance level, school growth level, general performance, demand for position, loan reimbursement, level of education, and the current year's evaluation compared to the previous year's.

Connecticut	<p>Elementary and secondary school teachers who teach in high-needs school districts (those serving low-income families) may qualify for student loan forgiveness after five years. The borrower must have taught full-time for five consecutive academic years at a qualifying school.</p>
Delaware	<p>The Delaware Talent Cooperative program provides between \$5,500 and \$7,500 over two years for eligible educators already working in participating schools. Educators can earn this award annually, for a total of up to \$15,000. Initial training and ongoing professional learning is covered at no cost to the educator.</p>
District of Columbia	<p>Any WTU member who earns an IMPACT rating of Highly Effective is eligible for IMPACTplus. IMPACTplus has two parts: an annual bonus after one year of being rated Highly Effective and an increase in base salary after two consecutive years of being rated Highly Effective.</p>
Florida	<p>Florida provides differential pay as an incentive to get teachers into high needs schools and shortage subjects. All teachers hired after July 1, 2012 are to be placed on the new performance pay scale. Veteran teachers may move to the new performance pay schedule. If they relocate or are transferred to a new district, they will automatically be put on annual contracts for life and lose their Professional Service Contract.</p>
Georgia	<p>Georgia provides additional pay incentives for those willing to teach in high needs school districts, or in shortage subjects. The state provides support stipends, currently \$500 per semester, for individuals seeking secondary credentials, or degrees in early childhood education, or child development. Georgia rewards early care and education professionals for their educational attainment and for remaining employed in the same child care program for at least 12 consecutive months. Awards range from \$250 to \$1250 depending on the level of education attained.</p>

Hawaii	Hawaii is currently experiencing a shortage in special education trained teachers, so additional salary and benefits are being offered in that area. Incentives range from \$10,000 over 3 years to \$3,000 for each year of employment (no time limit denoted).
Idaho	Idaho uses a salary schedule that rewards teachers for years of service to the state, as well as higher levels of education. There is no differential pay offered for teaching in high need districts or subjects.
Illinois	The Illinois Teacher's Loan Repayment Program provides awards to encourage academically talented Illinois students to teach in Illinois schools in low-income areas.
Indiana	The Next Generation Hoosier Educators scholarship awards up to \$7,500 for no more than 4 years to 200 applicants at accredited post-secondary educational institutions approved by the commission.
Iowa	Iowa offers between \$5,000 and \$17,500 in loan forgiveness benefits to certain full-time teachers who serve in designated low-income schools. The Teach Iowa Scholar (TIS) Program provides qualified Iowa teachers with awards of up to \$4,000 a year, for a maximum of five years, for teaching in Iowa schools in designated shortage areas.
Kansas	The Governor has expressed an interest in instituting a merit pay system for teachers in the state.
Kentucky	Salaries and incentives are determined on a district by district basis.
Louisiana	Louisiana provides differential pay for teachers willing to work in high demand districts and in shortage subjects. Teachers also receive merit pay based on Compass evaluation ratings.
Maine	Maine does not provide incentives for teachers in high needs schools or shortage subject areas.

Maryland	Maryland provides additional pay support to teachers working in high needs schools and shortage subjects. Salary schedules are left up to the individual school districts.
Massachusetts	The aMAzing Educators program provides; performance based compensation, scholarships for those who agree to become teachers for at least one year, loan forgiveness for teachers in hard to staff assignments, special education, and in high need schools.
Michigan	Michigan does not provide additional pay for teachers working in high needs schools or shortage subjects. The State recently conducted buyouts of teachers in 2016 having previously conducted buyouts in 2010.
Minnesota	Minnesota does not currently provide differential pay for teachers in high needs schools or shortage subjects; however teacher shortages are resulting in calls for financial incentives for teachers who want to work in high-need areas.
Mississippi	Mississippi provides additional salary for teachers in high needs schools and shortage subjects. Teachers in critical shortage areas may receive two years of - tuition, fees, books, and average cost of room/meals for two years of teaching. The state offers up to \$4000 in loan forgiveness for one year of teaching.
Missouri	Missouri does not provide any additional pay for teaching high-demand districts or school subject. Districts offer various monetary incentives for national certification.
Montana	Montana provides loan forgiveness to teachers willing to work in high demand schools and shortage subjects.
Nebraska	Nebraska provides loan forgiveness to teachers in high needs schools and shortage subject areas. Salary bonuses for ESL teachers are offered by some schools in the state.

Nevada	Nevada offers \$4000 per new teacher working in under performing schools. The Teach Nevada scholarship provides \$3,000/semester, per-student, not to exceed an aggregate of \$24,000 per-student.
New Hampshire	New Hampshire provides loan forgiveness for teachers willing to work in high need schools or shortage subjects.
New Jersey	New Jersey does not provide any additional pay for teaching high-demand districts or school subject.
New Mexico	New Mexico does not provide any additional pay for teaching in high needs schools or shortage subjects
New York	Recently hired teachers working in select high-need schools may be eligible for an annual award of \$3,400 for up to four years through the Teachers of Tomorrow (TOT) program. Master Teachers, who work intensively with other teachers, providing one-on-one coaching and guiding professional development, earn a \$20,000 salary differential. Model Teachers share and model proven teaching techniques with their peers, inviting other teachers into their classroom, and demonstrating those techniques in practice. They receive a \$7,500 salary differential. New York further provides loan forgiveness and scholarships for teachers willing to work in high-needs areas.
North Carolina	Teacher pay increases each year, and those who hold advanced degrees, such as a Master's degree, are also paid higher salaries. Mentoring new teachers and becoming National Board Certified Teachers can also result in additional salary in North Carolina.
North Dakota	The Teacher Incentive Grant Program provides financial assistance to teachers who wish to explore new and creative ways of integrating the arts into other areas of the curriculum.

Ohio	Ohio school districts follow a salary schedule for minimum teacher pay that starts at \$17,300 for 1st year teachers with no college degree, and culminating at \$32,460 for teachers with more than 11 years of experience and a master's degree. The Ohio Department of Education also rewards teachers with different monetary awards and recognitions, including the Ohio Teacher of the Year Award.
Oklahoma	The Teacher Shortage Employment Incentive Program (TSEIP) is a legislative ruling administered by the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education. TSEIP was designed to recruit and retain mathematics and science teachers in Oklahoma. Successful candidates will be reimbursed eligible student loan expenses (a set amount, which may vary yearly) or an equivalent cash benefit.
Oregon	Oregon provides loan forgiveness for teachers in high needs schools.
Pennsylvania	The state offers differential pay and loan forgiveness as incentives for teaching in high-needs schools or in subject areas with shortages.
Rhode Island	Rhode Island completed a trial pay-for-performance program in two districts in the 2013-2014 school year. At this point the program has concluded and no further action appears to have been taken.
South Carolina	South Carolina provides loan forgiveness for teachers in high needs schools and shortage subjects. The state also provides incentives for attaining National Board Certification, ranging between \$5,000 and \$7,500.
South Dakota	South Dakota dedicates revenue from video lottery for the purpose of supplementing teachers' salaries.
Tennessee	An LEA may be awarded incentive funds up until the maximum threshold of \$5,000 per year. Incentive funds are awarded on a first come, first served basis up to a statewide ceiling of \$100,000 per fiscal year.

Texas	<p>First year teachers are provided with a minimum salary of \$27,320, and teachers with 20 or more years of teaching experience are provided with a minimum salary of \$44,270. The most successful teachers in Texas can also receive merit awards, such as the Texas Educator Excellence Award and District Awards for Teacher Excellence.</p>
Utah	<p>House Bill 203 extends income supplements that are already offered to teachers of math and science classes to those that teach courses in engineering, special education, and computer science. The annual compensation is also being increased; qualified teachers would receive a supplemental \$5,100 to their income in 2016 (up from \$4,100), with incremental \$1,000 increase up to \$10,000 in 2021.</p>
Vermont	<p>Vermont does not seem to have any ongoing teacher incentive programs. In its recent Educator Equity report the state identifies issues which run counter to the national trend with regards to teacher retention. The major issue appears to be rural isolation and cultural acclimation rather than working in a high-minority environment.</p>
Virginia	<p>The Virginia Teaching Scholarship Loan Program (VTSLP) provides financial support to students who are preparing to teach in one of Virginia's critical shortage teaching areas. The critical shortage teaching areas are determined annually through the Supply and Demand Survey for School Personnel, based on data received by school divisions in Virginia. Shortages in specific subject areas are derived from the top 10 academic disciplines identified by the survey as shortage fields.</p>
Washington	<p>Teachers in qualifying challenging schools will receive an additional bonus up to \$5,000. This additional bonus is based on the teacher's percentage of time spent at the qualifying challenging school.</p>
West Virginia	<p>HB 2389: Teachers receive an annual \$1000 permanent salary increase per year.</p>
Wisconsin	<p>Teachers who receive performance based bonuses fall into one of four categories, with different dollar amounts assigned to each. They include "distinguished" (\$2,800), "high performing" (\$1,900), "proficient" (\$1,575) and "average" (\$500). The two lowest categories – basic and unacceptable – do not come with bonus money. After six years teachers are expected to rank above the "average" category to get a bonus.</p>

Wyoming

In 2014 Gov. Mead recommended that educator's salaries be increased to a more competitive level in order to attract/retain teachers. However, Wyoming does not appear to offer any incentives at this time.

National Board Certified Teachers and Student Achievement

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In the 1980s, the nation's focus on American pre-college education sharpened as a result of the publication of two significant reports. *A Nation at Risk* (United States Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) and *A Nation Prepared* (Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, 1986) shed light on the flaws in the American education system, as well as making an overt connection between the nation's economic performance and the quality of education. According to both reports, America was failing in its educational objectives and the economy was under threat as a result. The latter of the two reports offered a solution to the growing problem: focus on improving teacher quality (Vandevoort, Beardsley, and Berliner, 2004).

In response to these reports, the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) was created. They called for stronger teaching standards and the professionalization of the workforce. They worked to create five core propositions intended to be similar to the Hippocratic Oath in medicine. These propositions became the foundation for a set of comprehensive national teaching standards and eventually National Board Certification (Vandevoort et al., 2004).

The first teachers to become National Board Certified did so in 1994: they numbered less than one hundred (Vandevoort et al., 2004). Now, there are more than 110,000 National Board Certified Teachers (NBCTs) across the country, with more than 4,000 receiving their certifications in 2013-14 (National Board for Professional Teaching Standards [NBPTS], 2014). One of the main reasons for this sudden spike in certifications is the increased focus on teacher quality as a result of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). The act charges that by the 2005-06 school year, every student would be taught by a "highly qualified teacher." Many states, in addition to developing pedagogy tests for their teachers, have allowed National Board Certifications to demonstrate that a teacher is "highly qualified" (Vandevoort et al., 2004).

Many states, including Maryland, have encouraged teachers to seek certification in a number of ways. Besides the certification going towards the Advanced Professional Certificate, Maryland offers hefty financial incentives to teachers who complete the process. More than twenty states have similar programs designed to reward their NBCTs. However, ever since the NBPTS's inception, one question has been asked above all others: are NBCTs more effective than other teachers?

The first major studies analyzing NBCTs began in the early 2000s, most likely as a response to NCLB. Nine key studies, published between 2004 and 2015, attempted to determine if the National Board Certification process accurately assessed teacher quality. One of the biggest problems with researching this issue has been the lack of previous research, and as a result, every new study moved into relatively uncharted territory. The results of the investigations were split: about half of the studies show a positive relationship between NBCTs and teacher quality, while the other half found that the relationship either didn't exist or that the data was inconclusive. However, a consistent issue in the studies' methodology calls into question their results: the lack of an experimental method.

When conducting a study on National Board Certified Teachers, two major questions must be answered: first, do students of NBCTs perform significantly better than students of non-NBCTs? And second: does the NBCT process effectively distinguish between effective and non-effective teachers? Each of the nine studies included in this report try to answer at least one of these questions using statistical analysis of student and teacher data.

After reading through the different studies, one can quickly realize which ones were positive towards NBCTs and which ones were not. In regards to student achievement, the split was very clear: three studies stated that students of NBCTs have significantly higher levels of

student achievement, while the other six take the opposing view. For the second guiding question, however, the research differs drastically. Four studies state emphatically that the certification process weeds out ineffective teachers, but the remaining five claim to have come to different conclusions. Two didn't even address the question, one stated flat-out that the process didn't accurately locate effective teachers, and the last one's findings were inconclusive on the subject at hand. With that in mind, the reports of the past decade paint two very different pictures of National Board Certified Teachers.

The early studies tended to be more limited in scope. The first significant piece of research, published in September 2004, analyzed student achievement data from 14 different Arizona school districts, focusing on students in grades 3 through 6 taught by 35 different NBCTs (Vandevoort et al., 2004, pp. 19-20). The study was comprised of two parts: the first consisted of the statistical analysis of SAT-9 scores, the standardized test in Arizona at the time of the study. The second was a compilation of surveys answered by both NBCTs and their principals (Vandevoort et al., 2004, p. 19). As the second part is self-reported data, its findings should be considered less trustworthy than the objective analysis of the students' scores. Through various sampling techniques, the authors tried to reduce non-random bias, but stated that "there is no way to guarantee [...] was completely successful in eliminating bias" (Vandevoort et al., 2004, p. 22).

The study found that in classrooms taught by NBCTs, the average effect size was .122. This is the equivalent of a month's gain per year on the SAT-9 (Vandevoort et al., 2004, p. 34). This indicates that NBCTs were much more effective in teaching their students. Students taught by NBCTs gained the equivalent of, on average, 25 extra days of teaching (Vandevoort et al., 2004, p. 36). With this preponderance of evidence, the authors declared that the NBPTS certified

effective teachers and incentives for such teachers may be helpful in promoting student achievement.

The next affirmative study came later in 2004, authored by Linda Cavalluzzo of the CNA Corporation. While the previous study had looked at less than fifty NBCTs spread out over 14 Arizona school districts, Cavalluzzo decided to narrow her focus to the Miami-Dade school district in Florida. In addition, the analysis only includes mathematics scores, and looks at the ninth and tenth grades (Cavalluzzo, 2004, p. 1). This study is far more advanced than the previous ones, looking at 108,000 students from the Miami-Dade system using highly detailed data (Cavalluzzo, 2004, pp. 10-11). It separates the teachers involved into four groups: NBCTs, those teachers who applied for certification but either failed or withdrew, teachers with pending applications, and teachers who never applied (Cavalluzzo, 2004, p. 8). The last group serves as the control group and allows the author to analyze the true power of the certification process.

The analysis indicated that “NBC teachers are doing things that result in higher average gains for students. In addition, the NBPTS process successfully discriminates among applicants of varying quality” (Cavalluzzo, 2004, p. 25). This study is far more useful than the previous ones, as it uses a complex dataset to account for a multitude of confounding and lurking variables. It controlled for almost every major effect, including demographics, absences, and English language proficiency (Cavalluzzo, 2004). The findings seem to suggest that not only do the students of NBCTs perform better, but that NBCTs are far more effective than their peers.

The third “positive” study was authored by Dan Goldhaber and Emily Anthony of the Urban Institute in 2005. The authors commissioned the study to answer three questions implied by previous research: does the NBPTS weed out bad applicants; are NBCTs highly effective teachers; and does the assessment process help to increase teacher effectiveness? The reasons

they cited for focusing education research on National Board Certification were twofold: first, that certification might be able to “weed out” less effective teachers; and second, that it might serve as a form of professional development (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2005, p. 3). The federal government, in its push for highly qualified teachers at the time, supported the use of NBPTS certification as a measure of teacher quality. Goldhaber and Antony merely wished to see if the claim of NBCTs being “effective teachers” held true.

Like the first report, the study looks at data collected from elementary school students, this time from all across North Carolina from the 1996-1997 to 1998-1999 school years. The growth in students’ scores on state-administered reading and mathematics tests served as the dependent variable. The authors decided to use several different models, but their primary one compared, using the variable t (school year), future NBCTs (those who would become NBCTs by the 1999-2000 school year), current applicants (status pending in year t), new NBCTs (those certified in year t), and past NBCTs (those certified prior to year t) (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2005, p. 15). These four variables allowed Goldhaber and Anthony to compare successful applicants to rejected ones and to determine the validity of the assessment process. In addition, the authors used the model to test a hypothesis of their own. Based on previous models, they believed that the time-intensive application process detracted from teacher effectiveness in the short term (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2005, pp. 15-16).

The findings of the study do reflect positively on the NBPTS process: students of NBCTs were expected to outperform their peers taught by unsuccessful applicants by about 5 percent of a standard deviation in reading and 9 percent of a standard deviation in mathematics (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2005, p. 16). However, even though NBCTs are more effective than their unsuccessful counterparts prior to certification, with non-applicants falling somewhere in the

middle, they are relatively as effective as non-applicants during the NBPTS process. It does appear that the application itself decreases teacher effectiveness in the short term (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2005, p. 16). In addition, the assessment does not appear to enhance effectiveness among applicants: the models “provide no evidence that completing the NBPTS assessment increases teacher effectiveness” (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2005, p. 18). The last conclusion in the study was equally as shocking: after controlling for the nonrandom distribution of teachers to different groups of students, the authors discovered that in reading, new NBCTs were no more effective than the unsuccessful applicants and past NBCTs were equal to non-applicants. In mathematics, past NBCTs were actually less effective than non-applicants: while the small sample of past NBCTs may play a role in these results, they are still contradictory to previous findings (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2005, p. 22). The overall findings of the study are clear: the NBPTS assessment clearly delineates the more effective and less effective applicants, but students of NBCTs do not appear to perform significantly higher than their peers taught by non-applicants.

In 2008, the National Bureau of Economic Research commissioned an experimental study of NBCTs, the first of its kind. It analyzed NBCTs in a brand new approach, looking at the scores on the NBPTS assessment as an indicator of future student achievement. The authors claimed that they could accurately “evaluate the ability of the NBPTS to identify those teachers with the biggest impact on student achievement as determined by standardized test scores” (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 1). The study innovated in many new ways, but the most drastic shift from previous studies was the use of an experimental design. By randomly assigning students to teachers, the study’s authors lessened bias that could have otherwise hampered an observational study (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 11).

The study used the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) as the dataset. The authors chose LAUSD due to their use of financial incentives to encourage NBCTs to teach at “high-priority” schools, which make up an astonishing eighty percent of the district. As of 2004, 1790 LAUSD teachers had applied for National Board Certification, with 1129 certified as effective teachers by the NBPTS (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 7). The authors then laid out their experimental procedure: they claimed that previous research possessed two major flaws: it was non-experimental and looked at the NBCTs as a group. None of the studies analyzed the scaled scores of applicants or more importantly, the individual weighted sub-scores (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 8). To rectify these flaws, the authors partnered with the LAUSD to create an experimental study of teachers of grade 2-5 over the school years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005.

99 pairs of teachers, one an applicant for certification and the other a comparison teacher, were randomly assigned classes of students, which were created to create roughly similar classrooms for comparison. The comparison teacher taught in the same school-grade year and calendar track as the NBCT, as well as possessing at least three years of experience (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 11). The study also included a non-experimental portion, where all remaining NBCTs and qualifying comparison teachers in grades 2-5 were analyzed. The non-experimental portion looked at three distinct periods: “the *non-experimental sample* during the *experimental period* (2004-2005); for the *non-experimental sample* during the *pre-experimental period* (2000-2003); and, for the *experimental sample* during the *pre-experimental period* (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 4).

The results of the study were varied, but possessed a high level of statistical accuracy. First, to test the effectiveness of random assignment, the authors tested the baseline characteristics of students assigned to both NBCTs and comparison teachers. They found that

“the random assignment process produced similar classes of students for each group of teachers” (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 24). However, in the non-experimental sample, the findings concluded that “National Board applicants were regularly assigned students who are stronger academically than those assigned to non-applicants within the same school” (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 24). Deeming the process valid, the authors then looked at the main focus of the study: using the various scores from the assessment as predictors of student achievement.

Shockingly, the study found that students of NBCTs did not perform consistently higher than non-applicants in mathematics, the difference being only .046 standard deviations based on a normal model of student scores in LAUSD. However, the students of unsuccessful applicants scored on average 0.173 standard deviations lower, a statistically significant amount at a 99 percent confidence level. In language arts, students of NBCTs do perform consistently higher than students of comparison teachers, with a difference of 0.060 standard deviations. Student of unsuccessful applicants, as in mathematics, perform significantly lower, with a difference of 0.134 standard deviations (Cantrell et al., 2008, pp. 27-28). The non-experimental sample is roughly similar in its findings to the experimental portion. In addition to their findings on student achievement, their tests regarding the assessment itself were met with mixed results. The authors found that if the 10 sub-scores were re-weighted, the predictive power of the scaled score would double. Even with its flaws, however, the assessment was found to be effective in weeding out ineffective teachers (Cantrell et al., 2008, p. 42).

Six years after the publication of the NBER working paper in December 2008, the Center for Education Data & Research at the University of Washington Bothell commissioned a pair of reports regarding National Board Certification. The reports, written by James Cowan and Dan Goldhaber, incorporated many aspects of previous studies. The study encompassed Washington

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State which at the time had the fourth largest population of NBCTs in the entire nation, partly due to an immensely successful incentive program (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015a, p. 6). The dataset included student records from 2006-07 to 2008-09 at grades 4-6 and from 2009-10 to 2012-13 at grades 4-8. The addition of grades 6-8 in the latter time period is due to a change in the state's records, allowing the authors to link teachers to students at higher grade levels (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015a, p. 7). Borrowing from the 2008 NBER paper, Cowan and Goldhaber analyze the linear relationship between the scaled scores of NBPTS applicants and student achievement as well as the standard categorical tests.

The results are relatively consistent with previous studies: there is a clear link between NBCT status and student achievement. NBCTs are "about 0.01 to 0.05 standard deviations more effective than non-NBCTs with similar levels of experience" (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015a, p. 3). In regards to the scaled score of the assessment, "a one standard deviation difference on the National Board assessment score corresponds to an approximately 0.04-0.05 standard deviations difference in student achievement." These findings are remarkably similar to those of the NBER report, indicating a use for the scaled score as a measure of teacher effectiveness (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015a, p. 18). Among elementary school students, those taught by successful applicants outperform those taught by unsuccessful applicants by a margin of 0.09 standard deviations. This corresponds to a difference equivalent to an extra 4.5 weeks of learning. The margin among middle school students, however, is far smaller, at only 0.06 standard deviations for mathematics and 0.03 in reading. At neither value is an NBCT statistically more effective than unsuccessful applicants (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015a, p. 17). However, this study and the four before it have indicated that not only do students of NBCTs outperform their peers, but that the NBPTS assessment "weeds out" less effective teachers.

While many reports sing praises of the NBPTS and its assessment, there are several that claim it is flawed or even useless. One of the earliest studies of NBCTs, published in March of 2005 and commissioned by the NBPTS itself, took that very stance. Written by William Sanders, James Ashton, and S. Paul Wright, the report analyzed scores on mathematics and reading tests from two large North Carolina school districts, ranging from the years 1999-2000 to 2002-2003 and grades 4 through 8. After exclusions due to insufficient data points, the student records analyzed numbered over 130,000. The authors set out to make three broad comparisons: “(1) NBCTs versus teachers who have never been involved in the certification process, (2) NBCTs versus teachers who planned to attain certification in the future, (3) NBCTs versus teachers who failed in their attempt at certification” (Sanders et al., 2005, p. 2).

Using these three comparisons as a launching point, four models were created, utilizing four categories of NBCT status. The categories, in order, were certified, attempted and failed, will participate, and never (Sanders et al., 2005, p. 5). Models 1 and 2 utilized students’ raw scores as the dependent variable, while models 3 and 4 analyzed student achievement using gain scores. Models 1 and 3 were considered comparable to previous studies, but Models 2 and 4 included “a random teacher effect with a separate variance component for each certification status” (Sanders et al., 2005, p. 5). Not including this effect leads to “inferences that are overly optimistic,” and are not found in previous research (Sanders et al., 2005, p. 5).

The study did not provide affirmation for the use of NBCT incentive programs. Models 1 and 3 validated the long-held belief that students of NBCTs performed better than their peers. “The sizes of the effects were generally less than one-half of a scale score unit and translated to standardized effect sizes that averaged 0.09 and 0.04 for math and reading, respectively, in Model 1, and 0.06 and 0.02 in Model 3,” which were roughly equivalent to previous findings

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(Sanders et al., 2005, p. 6). However, in models 2 and 4, the authors found no statistically significant results: students of NBCTs performed no better than students of other teachers. And according to Sanders and the other authors, "Models 2 and 4, by properly accounting for the nested structure of the data, produce more defensible results (2005, p. 8). Another aspect of the study, looking at the variability within the previously defined categories of teachers, found that students were just as likely to get an "effective" teacher if their teacher was certified or not. In other words, the assessment process is ineffective in sorting out good teachers from the bad (Sanders et al., 2005, p. 7). The findings of this study paint a striking picture: one of wasted dollars and time on a seemingly useless program.

A year after the publication of the NBPTS report, another study was prepared on behalf of the National Board. The study would look at NBCTs using both student achievement data, as before, and through a series of other data points including observations and interviews. During the first phase of the study, data from three North Carolina school districts was utilized: test scores from 5th grade students were compared to statistical predictions, with the findings then standardized and aggregated by teacher (McColskey et al., 2006, pp. 10-11). Using the collected data, the second phase involved separating non-NBCTs into quartiles, taking the most effective and less effective quartiles, and comparing them to NBCTs on 15 different variables (McColskey et al., 2006, p. 12). The fifteen variables were separated into three groups based on the data and the methods by which it was collected: pre-instructional and dispositional, in-class, and teacher effectiveness (McColskey et al., 2006, p. ix). The sample size for this study is limited to 307 fifth-grade teachers in phase I and 51 fourth- and fifth-grade teachers for phase II (McColskey et al., 2006, p. 14).

After aggregating student achievement by teacher, the teacher's effectiveness was given a number on the Teacher Achievement Index (TAI). In phase I of the study, it was found that there was "no significant correlation between the TAIs and teacher characteristics of years of service, ethnicity, and pay grade" (McColskey et al., 2006, p. 64). More surprisingly, the findings showed that students of NBCTs didn't perform significantly better on either the mathematics or reading tests than students of non-NBCTs. They did seem, however, to have a narrower range of scores, as indicated by the tighter grouping of NBCT's TAIs (McColskey et al., 2006, p. 64). In phase II of the study, the group of NBCTs had higher instances of post-masters coursework, were found to be more effective in lesson planning, and reading comprehension assignments created by NBCTs were more cognitively challenging than those given by non-NBCTs. While NBCTs were found to be more effective in the pre-instructional phase, the in-class variables showed no key differences in NBCTs. Even more shocking, in the teacher effectiveness set of variables, the most effective non-NBCTs actually surpassed the NBCTs in four out of fifteen dimensions (McColskey et al., 2006, pp. 58-59). The findings of this study clearly state that NBCTs are not significantly more effective than other teachers, striking another blow against the claims of the NBPTS.

In 2008, the same year as the influential NBER report, a study co-authored by Douglas Harris and Tim Sass also took a look at the influence of National Board Certification on teacher effectiveness. Their report is remarkable for its large scope: the data was taken from all across Florida over a four year span (2000/01-2003/04), looking at grades three through ten. When all said and done, the study encompassed over one million students and tens of thousands of teachers in both reading and mathematics (Harris and Sass, 2008, pp. 12-14). The student achievement data comes from two tests: the Sunshine State Standards (SSS) exam and the

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Stanford-9 achievement test. The primary test used for analysis is the SSS exam, with the Stanford-9 being used only when the results differ from the SSS exam. The scores are normalized by grade and year in order to be used in the statistical analysis (Harris and Sass, 2008, p. 15). The large dataset was useful in many regards: it allowed the authors to analyze the effect of NBCTs at different levels of schooling, to control for differences in teacher groups, and to properly account for heterogeneity in the student population (Harris and Sass, 2008, p. 3). The authors also used data on NBCT mentoring programs to determine the effect that the presence of NBCTs has on teachers in schools (Harris and Sass, 2008, p. 13). However, one major flaw in an otherwise astoundingly thorough dataset is the inability to determine rejected NBCT applicants from the pool of non-NBCTs. The variable for NBCT is therefore dichotomous: NBCT or not (Harris and Sass, 2008, p. 12).

The first model created by the authors tests the effect of NBCTs on their own students. On both tests and in both subjects (reading and mathematics), NBCTs are not found to be more effective than their non-certified colleagues (Harris and Sass, 2008, p. 16). In addition, the report validates the findings of Goldhaber and Anthony in regards to professional development: it does not appear that an NBCT's effectiveness increases post-certification (Harris and Sass, 2008, p. 17). Using the vast amounts of data at their disposal, the authors decided to test if NBCTs were more effective at different grade levels. However, as before, they found evidence contrary to popular belief. No difference in student achievement was detected in elementary schools, while NBCTs were found to be more effective before certification in middle school, but no different than non-NBCTs post-certification. In high school, NBCTs were found to be more effective than non-NBCTs post-certification, but only in mathematics (Harris and Sass, 2008, p. 20). The

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findings of this study contrast with the NBER report greatly, showing no difference between NBCTs and their fellow teachers.

The ninth and most recent study was published in March of 2015, authored by Cowan and Goldhaber. Using the same data collected from their earlier study, they set out to determine the impact of a teacher incentive policy in Washington State. At the time of the study, Washington had a two-tier incentive program for NBCTs. First, any NBCT would receive a \$5,000 yearly bonus for their certification. The second bonus, titled the Challenging Schools Bonus (CSB), was designed to incentivize NBCTs with up to \$5,000 to teach at high-poverty schools (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015b, p. 6). As before, the dataset included student records from 2006-07 to 2008-09 at grades 4-6 and from 2009-10 to 2012-13 at grades 4-8. However, the data now also includes student achievement data from reading in grade 10 (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015b, p. 12). The data now includes 2,470,049 student-year observations in math and 2,711,038 in reading, as well as 298,267 teachers, 62,635 of whom teach at challenging schools (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015b, pp. 34 and 35).

Compared to other tests, the findings of this test are inconclusive and muddled by statistical insignificance. The authors found “that the bonus increased the proportion of teachers with the NBPTS credential both by incentivizing incumbent teachers to apply for certification and through better recruitment of teachers who already possess the NBPTS credential. We find suggestive evidence that eligible schools have higher retention rates among NBCTs” (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015b, p. 21). Not only did the proportion of NBCTs at high-poverty schools increase, but even the retention of said teachers was higher than at other schools. However, the level of student achievement at these challenging schools was not found to be significantly higher, despite the greater number of NBCTs (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015b, p. 21). Cowan and

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Goldhaber, however, were quick to point out two major limitations in their analysis. The time period, they stated, was limited to the first five or six years after implementation of the CSB, when the program was still getting up and running. In addition, limiting the definition of an effective teacher to high student test scores is far too narrow. They cite evidence that “effective” teachers provide students with long-term educational support that is not measured by traditional student achievement tests (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2015b, p. 21). With this in mind, the authors of the study state that as of now, financial incentives meant to boost performance in high-poverty schools using NBCTs do not have basis in statistical evidence.

Ever since the publication of *A Nation at Risk*, the United States has been focused on education as a driver of the economy. Whether it be through federal law, such as the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001, through state-based initiatives, such as the Common Core, or even at the local level, education is being shaped anew to meet the 21st century’s needs. One of the centerpieces of this grand plan is teacher quality. In 2001, the Bush administration declared emphatically that by the summer of 2006, every teacher in the country would be “highly qualified.” As a result of federal and state policies, numbers of National Board Certification applicants surged to new heights. With more NBCTs than ever before, the time has come to sit down and thoroughly investigate the NBPTS’s claim of certifying the best and brightest teachers across the nation.

In all nine studies, they attempted to answer two basic questions: whether the students of NBCTs performed better than other students, and if the assessment process successfully discerned more effective teachers from the pool of applicants. Many of the earlier studies claimed to find correlation between student achievement and the presence of an NBCT, using statistical analysis of student test scores to back it up. However, the first three studies, published

in 2004 and 2005, suffered from small sample sizes and limited datasets. However, the sole experimental study done regarding NBCTs, the NBER working paper in 2008, claimed that the assessment process did accurately distinguish effective teachers, even if student scores for such teachers weren't significant. The fifth affirmative study, looking at students in Washington, did find significant evidence linking student achievement and NBCT effectiveness, while not suffering from the problems of the first three reports. Overall, the positive studies do suffer from limited observational data, but the experiment undertaken in the NBER working paper does show that there is some merit to the NBPTS assessment process.

However, the negatives do make a strong case against the NBPTS assessment and NBCTs themselves. All of them claimed that students of NBCTs were no better than their fellows, citing large datasets as evidence. It does seem that most, if not all, of the negative studies have significant statistical evidence and solid data modeling. However, in regards to the assessment process itself, the camp is much more divided. Many of the negative studies do highlight some of the positive effects of the application, showing how ineffective teachers are consistently weeded out by the process.

It seems premature to declare that students taught by NBCTs perform better than other students. However, there is significant evidence to show that successful applicants are more effective than the unsuccessful applicants. The NBPTS assessment process does seem to "weed out" ineffective teachers and certify only the best, as they claim. Financial incentives for NBCTs have been effective in getting increasing numbers of teachers to attempt certification, and while NBCTs may not be more effective than average teachers, the process does seem to identify ineffective teachers as well. However, due to the inconclusive statistical evidence so far, the best course of action would be to conduct a study of NBCTs within Maryland itself. Each study in

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this analysis came to a different conclusion, and it seems that location may be a factor in the effectiveness of NBCTs. With the number of certified teachers growing each year, it is important to discover the impact they have on the classroom and beyond.

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***Paradigm Shift 2016:
Bringing Maryland's Teacher Preparation Policies into the 21st Century***

**Submitted to
Interim Superintendent Jack Smith
Maryland State Department of Education**

**From
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Maryland Association of Directors of Teacher Education at Community Colleges
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February 2016

Abstract: This working paper was developed at the request of Interim Superintendent Dr. Jack Smith to provide an historic overview of the policy framework under which teacher preparation programs currently operate, suggest strengths and weaknesses of the current framework, offer guidelines for review and revision of the framework, and make recommendations for next steps.

Overview

In 1995, MSDE and MHEC, in collaboration with stakeholder groups, developed the Redesign of Education (*Redesign*) to establish a framework for teacher education in the State of Maryland. In the ensuing years the *Redesign* has placed Maryland in the forefront of educational policy. However many changes in the society and the field of education support a review of the framework and policies to assure Maryland retains its efficacy and preeminence in the development of an effective teaching force.

The success of the *Redesign* can be seen in the large number of effective Professional Development Schools developed and sustained by districts and universities over the years. Other improvements identified by leadership in higher education and school systems in on-going discussions and reports include the strengthening of mentoring skills, increased time in classroom by teacher candidates, the diversity of experiences available to students in well-structured programs and increased collaboration among schools and higher education.

But much has changed since 1995. The children of the schools in 1995 are now the parents of the next generation: the world has turned and with it the role of education. The concerns of the 1980s have turned into the expectations of the 21st century. Schools must now educate all students to a degree of competence unparalleled in the history of schooling. Competition is not among neighboring schools and towns, but comparisons are drawn across states and among countries. The vision of an international competition among educational systems has emerged from both the immediate access to events worldwide and the level of comparative data. The context of schooling then is very different from the original *Redesign* and moved more toward the worldwide vision as explicated in Maryland's Race to The Top grant. It is now time to align policy with this expanded vision of education by framing a new, concise, comprehensive and coherent policy framework.

The sheer volume and complexity of data available to school systems, schools and individual teachers has grown exponentially in the last ten years. Teachers are now faced with a wealth of data, but limited capacity to analyze and determine the essential elements that will lead to success for the students. But technology has gone far beyond data richness. Collaboration among higher education and P-12 institutions envisioned in the *Redesign* are now possible among schools and across the spectrum of educational institutions through Facebook type mentoring programs or blogs, webinars, SKYPE or online forums. Technology has changed forever both the demands and resources for schools and teacher education programs from hardware such as mobile devices to

websites, data sources and platforms that have changed teaching from providing knowledge to fostering learning. This has been promulgated through Maryland's commitment to the Maryland College and Career Ready Standards and represents a shift in perspective as to the purpose of schools. Reviewing the *Redesign* in the light of major changes in curriculum and technology seems essential.

Other external forces have also influenced the schools in Maryland since 1995. At the national level The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, ED Recovery Act as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) of 2015 have altered curriculum, assessment of students, accountability of schools and school systems, teachers and principal evaluations and commitments to our lowest performing schools. All of these major legislative efforts were initiated after the implementation of the *Redesign*. Likewise, in the field of teacher education major changes took place in the assessment of teacher education programs with a major shift from examining the inputs of teacher education programs to the assessment of the performance of the graduates of the programs. The reconstitution of National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) and Teacher Education Accreditation Council (TEAC) into the Council for Accreditation of Educator Preparation (CAEP) not only recognized the change, but moved from teacher education to educator preparation in part to recognize the many additional pathways to teaching.¹ However prescient the authors of the *Redesign* were in 1995, it would be difficult to suggest all of these changes and many not mentioned in this quick overview have been addressed in the current legislation and its related regulations. A review seems overdue.

The 1995 *Redesign*² has been implemented through the Maryland Institutional Performance Criteria (IPC).³ The IPC lists the four essential elements of all initial teacher preparation programs. These four elements and emerging areas of concern are noted below:

Strong Academic Background: Each cohort (e.g., 2007-2008 graduates) meets state qualifying scores on basic skills (Praxis I, Praxis Core, SAT, GRE or ACT scores) and content and pedagogy tests (e.g., Educational Testing Service, ETS) or American Council on Teaching of Foreign Language (ACTFL) tests.

- **Concern:** These "academic background" standards are not aligned with CAEP accreditation standards; CAEP does not require pedagogy tests.

Extensive Internship: Teacher candidates have extensive field-based preparation in PreK-12 schools with diverse populations, which include an

¹ See Appendix 1

² See appendix 2

³ See Appendix 3

internship within two consecutive semesters that at a minimum has 100 full days in a school.

- Concern: 100-day Internship models are “input” models, which are not based on performance or outcomes. The CAEP standards are less restrictive and align better with best practice.

Performance Assessment: The educator preparation provider (EPP) unit uses a performance assessment system that is based on the Interstate Teachers Assessment and Support Consortium (InTASC), national Specialized Professional Association (SPA) standards and/or the Essential Dimensions of Teaching, (EDoTs) and is assessed by a standards-based rubric.

- Concern: This standard does not address edTPA or ETS PPAT directly, and after all this time (20 years) standards will be more valuable and more relevant if they align with the measures that schools use to assess their teachers.

Linkage with PreK-12 Priorities: Programs prepare professional educators for assessment and accountability in Maryland, through focusing on the following reform elements: • Maryland College and Career-Ready Standards (MCCRS) • Ready for Kindergarten (R4K) (Early Childhood) • Student Learning Objectives (SLO) • PARCC Assessments (PARCC)

- Concern: The priorities stated above are high level MSDE priorities, but may or may not reflect all the LEA priorities. They are necessary but not sufficient. MSDE and LEA priorities may overlap, but new language should incorporate LEA partnerships as well as state goals. This standard requires real collaborations with LEAs (data sharing, cost-sharing, etc.) in order to be fully implemented, and currently this is not universally the case.

Looking for Evidence

Although teacher educators, school personnel and teacher candidates have attested, anecdotally, to the value of many aspects of the *Redesign* standards, between 1995 and 2016 there have been few, if any, research studies of the *Redesign* and the IPC that offer grounded evidence of the success of this model. At a time when teacher preparation programs (university-based and alternative training programs) are coming under scrutiny with respect to best practice, it is imperative that policies and regulations be grounded in evidence-based findings.

The P-20 Task Force on Teacher Education (2014-2015) offers compelling evidence from national and international comparisons that the following elements need to be included in a new framework:

- high quality mentoring;
- sustained K-12 and higher education involvement with the intention of support student growth in the schools and extended;
- multiple field experience and internship with diverse populations;
- residency induction model for all pre-tenured teachers that engages higher education teacher preparation programs in collaborative partnerships with school districts; and,
- career-long professional development programs and career ladders for educators that are aligned with the high expectations of Maryland College and Career Ready Standards.

Limitations of the IPC-Redesign

The IPC-Redesign, like most policy, was written broadly to permit changes over time; however, the time has come to rewrite this important set of policies. Illustrative limitations are listed below:

1. **The IPC-Redesign language is too limiting.** In some cases specificity is a limitation in the *Redesign*. For example, the explicit inclusion of 100 days over two semesters for the internship does not convey the purpose of that requirement. The focus should be on the outcomes, ensuring that the candidate's successful performance in the internship contributes to student learning. In the 2000 revisions of NCATE, and now CAEP, the field has moved away from an input model of requirements to a performance-based assessment of the internship. Likewise, the requirement of an internship over two semesters no longer fits with models of extended Internships that might match a block schedule in a K-12 school, or Pre-K programs, or a summer program in a public school.
1. **IPC-Redesign discourages innovation.** At the present there is no mechanism for proposing and validating Innovation. It would seem reasonable for a university in collaboration with a school district to propose an innovation to MSDE for review, then create an agreement for a pilot that includes a review period and an independent research component to determine the efficacy of the innovation. Likewise programs offered by educator providers through alternative models or out-of-state universities do not currently have independent assessment of the performance of the teachers nor are they required to meet standards such as CAEP. To maintain quality of the teaching force in the state, regulations should strive for consistency across all providers.

2. **Under current policy, LEAs are not held responsible for participating in the IPC-Redesign. That creates an unworkable situation for implementation of the standards. The *Redesign* has no requirement for K-12 schools or school districts to participate in the *Redesign*. School districts have been willing collaborators for the most part, but have the option to walk away or alter agreements without accountability to the State or to higher education (IHE) partners. A more balanced policy would structure a fully integrated teacher education process from pre-service through experienced teachers, with accountability on both sides of the partnership.**

This is a particularly important point, and will be discussed at length later in this paper. The revised policy needs to ensure that LEAs have an equal share of responsibility for implementing the internship components (PDS) of the Redesign. P-12 officers who have authority over the budget and access to data should be held accountable for school-based aspects of the implementation of the IPC-Redesign, including induction. Gaining access to the schools to do research and collect data (an essential part of assessing the effectiveness of our preparation efforts) continues to be a challenge, but is a solvable problem.

Guidelines for revising the IPC-Redesign

1. **The IPC-Redesign should incorporate all essential Maryland partners in the development of policy, programs and assessments, and hold all partners accountable for the teacher preparation continuum. Currently, MSDE serves as the state approval agency for teacher preparation programs. A model that incorporates IHEs (two-year and four-year) and the Local Educational Agencies in all areas of the process with shared decision-making on the development of policies would increase the likelihood of an integrated teaching profession from pre-service teaching through advanced professional certification.⁴**
2. **Maryland's IPC-Redesign should be fully aligned with the CAEP accreditation and SPA standards such that fulfilling one fulfills the other. The recent changes in national accreditation with greater emphasis on outcomes and an increased emphasis on clinical practice bring the CAEP and SPA requirements more in line with Maryland's model. Separate or additional standards in the IPC should be eliminated in favor of the national standards, accreditation and SPA recognition.**

⁴ An example of the disconnect: The new CAEP Accreditation Handbook indicates that Standard 3.2, all of Standard 4, and Standard 5.3 and 5.4 must be met for full accreditation. Previously, CAEP had only listed Standard 4 and 5.3/5.4. To meet standards 4 and 5.3/5.4 higher ed institutions will need instruments demonstrating impact on student learning and teacher effectiveness, along with other highly robust data sharing agreements with LEA's that do not currently exist. Thus, the IPC-Redesign needs to be modified to include a modified LEA/higher education relationship structure, in order to incorporate the required CAEP standards.

3. **All changes to IPC-Redesign should be informed by evidence-based research. IPC-Redesign should be reviewed every 5 years by collaborative review team (MSDE, IHEs, LEAs) Evidence-based decisions should inform changes in the IPC where possible. When best practice is used then a research and evaluation effort should be put in place to address the practice with the purpose of review and possible revision after five years.**
4. **IPC-Redesign should incorporate AAT program standards recognizing the critical contributions community colleges make to the teacher pipeline in Maryland. Alignment and linkage of AAT programs with state and CAEP standards so that CAEP, the State of Maryland and community college form alliances that both verify and recognize the quality of AAT programs, including but not limited to the field experiences, measurement of dispositions, contributions to diversity, and alignment for certification.**
5. **IPC-Redesign should incorporate explicit provisions and incentives for innovations for schools and universities to continue to enhance the accreditation process. These might include: online observations, multiple IHE's to work within a single PDS site, international settings or integrated onsite instruction/teaching/feedback teacher education programs.**

Next Steps

This paper outlines the opportunities that exist to dramatically improve a teacher pipeline that has served us well in the past, but is in need of urgent reform and revision. In order to reach our goals of recruiting the highest quality teachers, reaching higher teacher retention goals, aligning teacher education programs with the direct needs of school districts, and ultimately preparing Maryland's students for college and careers, we recommend that the Interim State Superintendent appoint a Statewide Task Force on Teacher Preparation to rewrite the current policies addressing the concerns raised in this paper, using the guidelines suggested here, and the charge to the task force should specifically incorporate the development of the Maryland MOU with CAEP, since a goal of the new IPC-Redesign will be to align Maryland standards with national accreditation.

The Task Force should be comprised of representatives from MSDE, LEAs and all segments of higher education (USM, MICUA, MACC, Morgan/St Mary's). Each segment head should be invited to nominate up to two members of the task force. The task force should be co-chaired by MSDE, an LEA Superintendent, and a Higher Education Chief Academic Officer, and should be directed to complete its work by April 30, 2016. The recommendations from the task force should be put before the State Board of Education in May, 2016, for implementation beginning July 1, 2016



**MARYLAND STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NUMBER OF TEACHERS THAT SEPARATED BETWEEN
OCTOBER 15, 2014 AND OCTOBER 15, 2015
FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE OR LESS**

Reason for Separation	Number
Death	2
Retirement	11
Dropped	
For provisional or substandard certificate	67
For inefficiency/ineffectiveness	64
For immorality, misconduct, insubordination, willful neglect of duty	6
For reduction in force	10
For resignation before non-renewal recommendation	39
Work in (education)	
Another country	42
Another state	201
Another local unit or the MD State Dept. of Ed.	105
A Maryland institution of higher education	138
A nonpublic school	20
Other type of position in the same local unit	6
Work in (other than education)	
Government services	11
Business	28
Defense work	2
Armed services	3
Other Voluntary Resignation	
Study	43
Move	342
Marriage	9
Maternity	20
Home responsibility	120
Personal illness	59
Dissatisfied with teaching	59
Other	410
Cause unknown	88
Leave of Absence	
For study	4
For illness	9
For maternity	23
Armed services	1
Other reasons	30
Total	2,012

DRAFT 7/29/16

Brackets indicate matter deleted from existing law

See Page 2 of this document to look at 11-208(a), (b), (c) without showing the current law that is being deleted

Article - Education

11-208.

(a) In this section, "national accreditation" means teacher education accreditation by an accrediting agency recognized [by the U.S. Department of Education and endorsed] by the Department.

(b) [(1) After July 1, 2004, an] AN institution of higher education in this State may not offer a program of undergraduate or graduate studies that would certify a recipient to teach unless the institution has received:

[(i)] (1) National accreditation; or

[(ii)] A waiver under paragraph (2) of this subsection] (2) **APPROVAL BY THE DEPARTMENT.**

[(2)] The State Superintendent may grant a waiver from the national accreditation requirements to:

(i) Any liberal arts college with a full-time equivalent enrollment of not more than 2,000 students; and

(ii) Any nationally recognized professional school of fine arts specializing in music or art.]

(c) (1) [By July 1, 2000, an institution of higher education in the State that offers a program of undergraduate or graduate studies that would certify a recipient to teach must:

(i) File its intent to seek national accreditation;

(ii) Certify to the Department that it has national accreditation; or

(iii) Have received a waiver under subsection (b)(2) of this section.] **WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER A NATIONAL ACCREDITING AGENCY IS RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT, THE DEPARTMENT SHALL CONSIDER WHETHER THE NATIONAL ACCREDITING AGENCY INCLUDES SIMILAR STANDARDS THAT ARE USED BY THE DEPARTMENT WHEN APPROVING A PROGRAM.**

(2) The accreditation process for an institution of higher education subject to this section shall be conducted in accordance with the protocol established by a [nationally recognized] NATIONAL accrediting agency and the Department.

(d) (1) In conjunction with accrediting agencies, the Department shall develop and administer a program of technical support to assist institutions of higher education in the State that seek NATIONAL accreditation under this section.

(2) In addition to the technical support provided to an institution of higher education under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Department shall pay:

(i) Any fee that [an] A NATIONAL accrediting agency charges an institution of higher education in connection with the accreditation process;

(ii) Any training fee that [an] A NATIONAL accrediting agency charges a State representative who serves with a review team of an accrediting agency in conjunction with an accreditation visit to an institution of higher education in the State; and

(iii) One-half of the expenses incurred by an institution of higher education in connection with the accreditation visit of a review team of [an] A NATIONAL accrediting agency.

(e) The Department shall adopt regulations to implement this section.

(f) The Governor shall provide sufficient funds in the Department's annual budget for the additional costs incurred by the Department under this section.

(a), (b), and (c) without the current law being repealed

(a) In this section, "national accreditation" means teacher education accreditation by an accrediting agency recognized by the Department.

(b) An institution of higher education in this State may not offer a program of undergraduate or graduate studies that would certify a recipient to teach unless the institution has received:

(1) National accreditation; or

(2) Approval by the department.

(c) (1) When determining whether a national accrediting agency is recognized by the department, the department shall consider whether the national accrediting agency includes similar standards that are used by the department when approving a program.

(2) The accreditation process for an institution of higher education subject to this section shall be conducted in accordance with the protocol established by a national accrediting agency and the Department.

